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Abstract
Female labor market activity is dependent on the presence and the age of a child, but
how do the determinants develop in magnitude and signiﬁcance with the child’s age? Us-
ing German SOEP data from 1991 to 2006 for mothers with young children, the change
in maternal labor supply when the child is one, two, and three years old is explicitly
addressed. According to the tobit regression results for precise working hours, maternal
labor supply becomes increasingly responsive to economic incentives - mainly to imputed
wages - as the child grows.
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The current debate about maternity leave policies in Germany centers around the topic of
maternal labor supply. Based on the aim of fostering fertility and the child’s well-being,
it is intended to facilitate mothers the work-life balance. As the question of mothers’
(re)entry into the labor market naturally comprises the timing of (re)entry, it is of great
relevance to consider the development of maternal labor supply as the child grows. Thus
it is of interest what determines if mothers return to the labor market and how much
they work? Most of all: do these factors change with the age of the baby? For example,
do mothers always respond to higher wages?
German mothers reduce their labor supply dramatically in the context of childbirth,
although maternal labor supply increased over the past decades in Germany as in most
other industrial countries.1 Geyer and Steiner (2007), for example, ﬁnd that mothers’
employment rate drops by almost 60 percentage points in the year of giving birth. This
appears huge in comparison to 30 percentage points in the UK, 16 percentage points
in Denmark and six percentage points in Italy (ibid. p. 17). As one reason for this
dissimilarity, the generosity of the German maternity leave policy has repeatedly been
cited (Sonderhof, 2007; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2007; Beblo et al., 2006) as it comprises
a three year period of job protection (“Elternzeit”, i.e. parental leave) for previously
employed mothers2 as well as diﬀerent kinds of beneﬁt payments (maternity beneﬁt,
transfer payments, child allowance). A reform of maternity beneﬁts came into eﬀect in
2007 and childcare policies are under way with the aim of facilitating the combination
of motherhood with work. Against the background of current reforms, and keeping in
mind that the timing of the (re)entry is one important component of fostering maternal
employment, it is thus indispensable to analyze its development and determinants in the
ﬁrst few years after childbirth.
Previous studies frequently focus on the participation decision (Schönberg and Lud-
steck, 2007; Bender et al., 2003; Voicu and Buddelmeyer, 2003) or solely distinguish be-
tween full-time and part-time work (Ondrich et al., 1999; Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000).3
1 See for example Jaumotte (2003); Gornick et al. (1998); Geyer and Steiner (2007) and for data on
Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt (1999).
2 In 1992 the job protection period during which a mother can return to a comparable job at her previous
employer was extended from 18 to 36 months (see for example Sonderhof, 2007). This however does not
aﬀect the present analysis. A precise summary of the German regulation can be found in Kreyenfeld
(2001) and Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007). The eﬀects of the prolonged maternity leave period on
the child are analyzed by Dustmann and Schönberg (2008).
3 Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2006) estimate participation rates for diﬀerent hours categories, but limit their
subsequent regression to odds ratios for full-time employment. Djurdjevic (2005) also uses diﬀerent
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Instead, the present paper uses a continuous speciﬁcation of working hours (as also done
by Geyer and Steiner, 2007) in order to capture labor supply most precisely. As work-
ing hours are naturally censored from below a tobit model is employed. Precise actual
working hours are provided by the GSOEP data where the waves from 1991 to 2006 are
used.
For the present subject it is a decisive question at what point in time mothers’ labor
supply is observed. Several studies pool over all mothers and simply control for the age
of the (youngest) child (Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2006). Their
approach attempts to explain long-term eﬀects of childbirth, whereas here a more short-
run perspective on the ﬁrst few years after birth is adopted. Pooling over the age of the
child as the previously mentioned studies do, however, is incapable of detecting potential
non-linearities in participation and working hours after birth as indicated for example
by Geyer and Steiner (2007, p. 9), Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2006) and Städtner (2004).
Simple inclusion of the age of the youngest child as one of the explanatory variables does
not solve the problem. Instead, variation of the impact of labor supply variables can only
be captured if separate regressions are run for diﬀerent ages of the child or analogously
suﬃcient interaction terms are included. This is done by Leibowitz et al. (1992) who
estimate participation rates separately for mothers with children of diﬀerent age groups.
The present study proceeds similarly but – after presenting detailed descriptive – runs a
regression with interactions of all covariates with the separate ages of the child. To my
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst analysis that uses this technique to detect changes in mothers’
labor supply.
The results clearly conﬁrm the non-linear development of the coeﬃcients for labor
supply in the ﬁrst few years after childbirth. More speciﬁcally, the wage, which is imputed
to account for the inherent non-observability for non-employed mothers, increases in
importance as well as the partner’s earnings. This important result suggests that mothers
grow increasingly responsive to economic incentives. Simultaneously, the labor force
participation before birth is strongly correlated with post-birth working hours. Moreover,
higher educated mothers and those living in the East of Germany clearly display higher
labor supply, whereas surprisingly no such interrelation seems to hold for the availability
of informal daycare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two sketches the theory
behind maternal labor supply. Next, the data are described and descriptive statistics





In this section the labor supply model with household production (Gronau, 1977) is ex-
tended to explicitly account for the eﬀect of the age of the child a mother has. The
extension of the model follows Leibowitz et al. (1992) who however build upon the stan-
dard neoclassical model of labor supply which only allows for market work and leisure4,
whereas the household production model adds home time. Here, the starting point is
given by the individual utility maximization under the budget and time constraint:
max
H1,H2
U(x,T − H1 − H2,C,µ) (1)
s.t. px = f(H2) + (w − cc)H1 + V
where x denotes consumption, C observable characteristics including the number and ages
of children, µ unobservable characteristics, and V non-labor income such as partner’s
earnings.5 Moreover, a mother can divide her total available time T between leisure,
market work H1 and home time H2 during which she produces goods with a value f(H2)
which denotes a concave home production function. In particular, home production
subsumes childcare, which otherwise has to be bought on the market for the price of cc
per hour so that her hourly net wage reduces to w−cc. Setting up the Lagrangian leads
to the following optimality condition:
w − cc = f0(H2) (2)
Leibowitz et al. (1992) observe that "younger children require more intensive supervi-
sion" (ibid. p. 117) and from this they follow that the hourly cost of childcare decreases
as the child grows (also Weber, 2004). This in turn raises maternal labor force partici-
pation as ﬁgure 1 shows – yet for the case of standard labor supply without household
production.
Here, the x-axis depicts the age of the baby relative to birth and the wage is graphed on
the y-axis.6 While the market wage w is assumed to remain constant over time (depicted
4 See the time allocation model of Becker (1965).
5 The standard model can be found for example in Franz (2006, p. 28).
6 The ticks on the x-axis are chosen arbitrarily to represent the age of the baby in quarters of a year up
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Figure 1: Labor force participation after childbirth
 
Source: Leibowitz et al. (1992, p. 118)
by the ﬂat line labeled A), the net wage w − cc increases over time as a consequence
of decreasing childcare costs (line B). Decreasing childcare costs over the child’s age
translate into a time dependency of childcare costs with δcct
δt < 0. Here, in the context of
childbirth, the reservation wage is assumed to change over time with a peak at delivery
when the distress from pregnancy is greatest and steadily declines thereafter (dotted
line). Re-entry into the labor force is determined by the crossing of the reservation wage
with the net wage due to the optimality condition that positive hours are only oﬀered if
w − cc > wR.
Turning to the framework with household production, ﬁgure 2 depicts non-labor income
(V ), the concave home production function f(H2) (dotted line), the net wage w − cc
(straight line) as well as the indiﬀerence curve between leisure and market work. The
interaction of these determines how much time is spent in home production, market
work, and leisure. More speciﬁcally, ﬁgure 2 illustrates how participation is determined
by the optimality condition that a mother works as long in household production H2
(movement along the concave home production function to the top left) until the net
wage exceeds her productivity at home (point of tangency). Thereafter, working hours
are determined from the point of tangency with the indiﬀerence curve. Now, as the child
grows, external childcare becomes cheaper (cc1 < cc0, see move to dashed line) and hence
participation increases unambiguously whereas time in home production is reduced (due
to the age of two years.
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to the concavity of the home production function). However, working hours depend on
the sum of the opposing income and substitution eﬀect and are thus undetermined from
theory, except if a constant amount of leisure is assumed.




                 
 w‐cc0
f(H2)   f(H2)
V
 hours of home production
 hours of market time
 leisure
Source: Own extension of the household model in Gronau, 1977, p. 1107
One crucial assumption of Leibowitz et al. (1992) is the constancy of the market wage
rate. In contrast, the depreciation of human capital leads to a reduction of the market
wage the longer the mother stays out of the labor force as is endorsed empirically for
example by Beblo et al. (2006) and Görlich and de Grip (2007). This partly counteracts
the increase in the net market wage from the reduced childcare costs in particular for
mothers who (re-)enter the labor market very late after childbirth. For ﬁgure 2 this
means that the increase of the net wage from period 0 to period 1 is not as strong as it
would be without human capital depreciation. In extreme cases, the eﬀect might even
reverse its sign.
The previous analysis is based on decreasing childcare costs as the child grows, but
Leibowitz et al. (1992) acknowledge that the costs also depend on childcare availability.
Poor childcare availability is a crucial problem in Germany.7 Geisler and Kreyenfeld
(2006) report childcare availability rates as low as 5 % for up to three year-olds in West
Germany for the year 2005 and van Ham and Büchel (2004) ﬁnd a discouragement eﬀect
7 Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2006); Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000); Kreyenfeld (2001, 2000); Bender et al.
(2003); van Ham and Büchel (2004)
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from poor childcare availability on the maternal labor supply. Moreover, Kreyenfeld
and Hank (2000) observe that the shortage of supply is more important for female labor
supply than the cost of childcare. However, regardless of formal daycare, informal daycare
is often available at the cost of a childminder. Alternatively the grandparents or other
relatives sometimes stand by to guard the child. Hence, maternal labor supply is expected
to decrease with the distance to the closest grandparents of the child as analyzed in Weber
(2004); Lauer and Weber (2003) and in the following.
Finally it should be noted that the responsiveness to childcare costs and availability is
largely inﬂuenced by personal preferences for childcare by the mother herself in contrast
to external childcare.8 In the Western part of Germany more than the majority of
mothers believes that small children would suﬀer from mother’s employment (Geisler and
Kreyenfeld, 2006, p. 8).9 Preferences and the acceptance of external childcare probably
also change as the child grows.
After these theoretical considerations, the following empirical analysis will shed some
light on the changing maternal labor supply during the ﬁrst few years after childbirth.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 199110 up to
the wave 2006, which includes among many other variables precise information on actual
working hours. Approving of the panel dimension of the SOEP, pre-childbirth information
is constructed from the wave preceding the year of childbirth in analogy to Lauer and
Weber (2003, p. 10). More precisely, the pre-birth information on employment status
is drawn 12 months or more before childbirth in order to avoid bias from a reduction
in labor supply as the pregnancy proceeds (analogously to "Ashenfelter’s dip" in the
training literature, see Ashenfelter, 1978).11 Similarly the ﬁrst post-birth data is taken
at age one, i.e. at least 12 months after childbirth, in order to assure that all women
8 Blau et al. (2005, p. 122) explain how the value of non-market time depends on tastes.
9 In 1992 74% of West-German mothers strongly or tentatively agreed to the statement that "A small
child will certainly suﬀer if the mother is employed." This percentage reduced to 62% in 2004 and
totaled 51% and 29% in East Germany in the two respective years. ibid.
10 However, no births from before 1992 are considered in order to avoid bias from the policy change in
that year which increased the maximum time of job protection from 18 to 36 months (Kreyenfeld,
2001; Sonderhof, 2007). 1991 data is only used for pre-birth information.
11 There are very few exceptions in which data from that point in time is not available because the
woman has just recently entered the SOEP. Reducing the minimum time span between the pre-birth
interview and childbirth to three months for those exceptions allows 3% of additional mothers to enter
the data set used.
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have reported that child’s birth already.12 This way working hours after childbirth are
drawn so as to make sure that the baby has turned one, two, or three years already, as
the precise age might play a role for childcare. The possibility that a mother may give
birth to another child is taken into account by always employing the age of the youngest
child.
The present analysis studies ’only’ mothers whereas some other papers include non-
mothers as a comparison group (Haan, 2005) and a few control for self-selection into
motherhood (Lauer and Weber, 2003 follow the approach from Hotz and Miller, 1988;
also see Djurdjevic, 2005). In contrast, the procedure employed here has the advantage of
allowing all coeﬃcients to vary freely in comparison to non-mothers. Some other studies
limit the sample to married women (Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2007) or
women who were working before birth (Weber, 2004; Bender et al., 2003; Ondrich et al.,
1999). However, as pointed out by Lauer and Weber (2003), the restriction to previously
employed women likely introduces a problematic self-selection bias. Therefore this study
is not limited to the mentioned subgroups but adequate controls are included.
In order to limit the sample of women to those in childbearing age, only mothers
who are between 18 and 47 years at childbirth are included. Births by younger or older
mothers are very rare and their labor supply decisions will be inﬂuenced to a very large
extent by education or retirement plans.13 For the same reason, namely incomparable
labor force participation decisions, women in education or in an apprenticeship as well as
pensioners and disabled are also dropped from the sample. The remaining mothers are
on average almost 32 years old and more than one third of them bears their ﬁrst child
ever as can be found in table 2 in the appendix.
When analyzing maternal labor supply it is insightful to distinguish between diﬀerent
forms of employment according to the quantity of working hours. Therefore, ﬁgure
3 documents the share of mothers not working, working in minor employment (1-15
hours), two distinct part-time categories (15-25 hours and 25-35 hours) and full-time
(35 hours and more). It pictures the large magnitude to which the event of childbirth
reduces female employment, in particular for ﬁrst-time mothers. In addition, it depicts
a continuous increase in all employment categories except in minor employment which
plateaus at the level of age two, suggesting that low working hours may serve as a stepping
12 The reason is that the birth notiﬁcation is taken from the post-birth year and thus some babies are
already older than 12 months. Therefore the sample of mothers with babies below one year of age
would be small and selective.
13 Comparable age groups have been used in the literature, for example by Lauer and Weber (2003),
Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2006) and Geyer and Steiner (2007).
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stone for higher working hours. In general, part-time work is clearly preferred to full-
time work after childbirth which is also supported by the study of Geisler and Kreyenfeld
(2006) on the basis of Microcensus data.
Figure 3: Grouped working hours for ﬁrst-time mothers (left) and mothers with more
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Nevertheless, as ﬁgure 4 shows average working hours conditional on working persist
between 20 and 25 hours and display little variation, only for mothers with more than
one child there is a notable increase in average working hours at age three of the newborn
(from 21.2 to 25.1 hours). Similar results are found by Geyer and Steiner (2007) who
report slightly higher conditional working hours except in a small dip which they detect
at age two.
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Finally, the correlation between the imputed wage14 and partner’s earnings on maternal
labor supply is reported in ﬁgure 5 which joins these two covariates since a positive
14 Wages are imputed because they are unobservable for non-employed mothers. In order to control
for self-selection into employment, the Heckman two-step procedure is employed and the results are
reported in table 1.
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correlation is expected due to assortative mating (Becker, 1991, Chap. 4). Both panels
side by side show that mothers with a lower potential wage are less likely to work, but
if they do they work higher hours. It is most interesting to note that the wage groups
are almost exactly ordered in the left panel, conﬁrming the higher propensity to work at
higher potential wages. Additionally, mothers whose partner earns very little appear to
work more.15
Figure 5: Average working hours after birth (left) and conditioned on working (right)
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Having established some empirical evidence on the relationship between the age of a
baby and the mother’s labor supply, the next section will deepen the empirical analysis
in a tobit regression analysis.
4 Estimation and Results
Due to natural data censoring at zero, a tobit regression model is employed where ac-
tual working hours constitute the dependent variable. Diﬀerent regressions are run for
separate points in time when the baby is one, two, or three years old (table 3).16 In
fact, the regression results in tables 3 and 4 are based on a single regression in which
all explanatory variables are interacted with the age of the child. The underlying model
reads as follows:
hoursi = β0
age1Xi ∗ Dage1 + β0
age2Xi ∗ Dage2 + β0
age3Xi ∗ Dage3 + i (3)
15 In case the partner’s income is not observed in the data either because the woman does not live in a
relationship or because he lives in another household, it is set to zero. Still, the following regression
will control for this by a dummy.
16 During the ﬁrst twelve months after childbirth only 11.8 % of mothers are working at all, so inclusion
of working hours from that age was not feasible here. Moreover, all multivariate analyses are weighted
by the inverse sampling probability.
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where each Xi contains a separate intercept and the Dage denote dummies for age one,
two, and three of the child. This procedure is identical to running three separate regres-
sions, but easily permits testing and adapting the standard errors to the panel structure
by clustering them on the individual level.17 For interpretation two distinct average
marginal eﬀects are reported: The ﬁrst relates to the eﬀect on the actual working hours
which takes into account that some mothers may change from non-employment into em-
ployment in relation with the change in the respective covariate.18 The second reported
marginal eﬀect reports the change in the probability of working.19 For comparison, the
employment probability of a mother who has another child between four and six years
and was not employed before birth is 6.6 %, 12.0 %, and 20.0 % at age one, two, and
three of the newborn, respectively. In contrast, these employment probabilities amount
to 40.8 %, 46.4 %, and 45.6 % respectively for a mother who has no other child and had
a white-collar job before giving birth.20
First, the economic incentives as measured by the imputed hourly wage21 and partner’s
earnings are signiﬁcantly related to mothers’ working hours in the expected direction.
Hence, maternal labor supply is higher when the potential wage increases, but lower
when the partner earns more. However and most interestingly, as the detailed results
show, at age one of the baby mothers’ labor supply is not signiﬁcantly related to these
covariates, but only from age two on, implying that money does not matter at age
one. This new insight indicates that women grow increasingly responsive to this type of
economic incentive as the child grows. This is to my knowledge the ﬁrst study to analyze
this eﬀect for Germany, whereas for the U.S. Leibowitz et al. (1992) ﬁnd to the contrary
that the predicted wage is already signiﬁcant three months after childbirth which is not
surprising against the diﬀerent institutional background in the U.S..
Next, the occupation before childbirth is also strongly correlated to labor supply there-
after. The direction of the coeﬃcients, which has to be interpreted in light of the reference
category of previously non-employed mothers, shows that labor force participation before
birth is decisive for a re-entry thereafter. Positive state dependence has also been found
17 This is necessary as a mother is usually observed three times.
18 It is calculated as
δE(yi|xi)






, see for example Wooldridge (2002, p. 523).










, see for example Verbeek (2004, p. 220).
20 Moreover, both reference mothers are between 28 and 32 years old, have completed an apprenticeship,
are married and live in the West of Germany. Their potential wages and the available partner incomes
correspond to the unconditional average.
21 Wages are imputed because they are unobservable for non-employed mothers. In order to control
for self-selection into employment, the Heckman two-step procedure is employed and the results are
reported in table 1.
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for example by Städtner (2004); Voicu and Buddelmeyer (2003) and Haan (2005) who
ﬁnds a strong eﬀect on the extensive, but only a modest if any eﬀect on the intensive
margin of labor supply (ibid.) leading to the same conclusion as the present analysis:
Participation before birth matters more than hours. In more detail the present results
show that self-employed and civil servants display the largest labor supply. For the latter,
the higher labor supply could be due to favorable working hours and good part-time work
opportunities as argued by Bender et al. (2003, p. 14). In their paper, they diﬀerentiate
only between blue and white collar workers and ﬁnd that the latter take shorter leaves
which is in line with the present analysis.
Care has to be taken when the other covariates are analyzed as some of them do not
only work directly, but also through the imputed wage (cf. table 1). For the education
variable the direct and the indirect eﬀect through the imputed wage oppose each other
but the latter dominates. Hence, as expected from Human Capital Theory, mothers
with a higher educational degree supply more labor to the market. Similarly, age also
works mainly through the imputed wage and in the direction as expected from Human
Capital Theory. For illustration, ﬁgure 6 in the appendix displays simulated employment
probabilities which also take the indirect eﬀect via the imputed wage into account. Again,
results for the two before-mentioned reference mothers are shown. Thus, younger mothers
tend to enter the labor market somewhat more frequently after childbirth as also found
by Weber (2004). In a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, Ondrich et al. (1999) ﬁnd that mothers with
the strongest labor force attachment tend to take full advantage of their leaves. Other
reasons apart from Human Capital Theory and labor force attachment may include birth
order or employment stability and deserve further attention.
The largest point estimate apart from the pre-birth occupation is given by the region of
residence where mothers living in the East of Germany work much more. However, this
correlation is again partly oﬀset by the negative eﬀect of this covariate on the imputed
wage. The higher labor supply of East German mothers is explained by the tight labor
market which goes along with fear of job loss and a much better childcare provision.
Along the same lines, van Ham and Büchel (2004) point out that a discouragement eﬀect
from poor childcare infrastructure might be at work in West Germany. Moreover, in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1980s it was common that mothers took
up full-time work again one year after childbirth (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2006) so that
historically grown attitudes could also play a role.22
22 To check whether origin or current residence matters, a regression was run with both, where the former
proved signiﬁcant at age two and three, but less than the current residence (not displayed). This lends
support to the stronger eﬀect of childcare availability and the tight labor market instead of attitudes.
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Surprisingly, ﬁrst-time mothers seem not to behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from mothers
who already have another child between four and six years old (reference category), except
at age two of the child. Conﬁrming the expectation, mothers provide more labor with
every month that the child grows (captured by the variable for the relative babyage which
runs from one to 12 months), although this is not the case in the paper of Lauer and
Weber (2003) who, however, consider only participation as the dependent variable.
It is also astonishing that the proxies for informal childcare (i.e. distance to the closest
grandparents, i.e. parents or in-laws) prove seldomly signiﬁcant individually, but still
they are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5 %-level. Correspondingly, Kreyenfeld and Hank
(2000) neither ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the distance to the grandparents nor of the
childcare provision rate. The controls for marriage and foreign nationality prove not
signiﬁcant here.
In a nutshell, the positive correlations of post-birth labor supply with the imputed
wage, the pre-birth occupation, and the region of residence stand out, as well as the
indirect eﬀect of education and age through the imputed wage.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how maternal labor supply changes as the child grows. Speciﬁ-
cally, changing working hours during the ﬁrst few years after childbirth are extensively
characterized. The focus of this paper is on how the determinants of maternal labor
supply develop in magnitude and signiﬁcance while allowing for a non-linear evolution
as suggested by the literature (Leibowitz et al., 1992; Geyer and Steiner, 2007). Hence,
in the present analysis the child’s age is not regarded as merely another explanatory
variable, but instead addressed explicitly both in the bivariate descriptive analysis and
in the tobit regression framework. Both empirical parts as well as the theoretical model
support continuously increasing labor supply after childbirth.
Similar to previous ﬁndings for Germany, female labor supply drops dramatically at
childbirth to about 12 % and only picks up slowly thereafter (Geyer and Steiner, 2007;
Lauer and Weber, 2003). Participation and not working hours is the driving force for the
recovery of maternal labor supply after childbirth. According to the bivariate analysis,
mothers with only one child exhibit a stronger labor force attachment than mothers with
more children.
The econometric approach allows for free variation of the coeﬃcients at diﬀerent ages of
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the child and the results conﬁrm the necessity for proceeding this way. The central ﬁnding
is that the economic incentives given by the imputed wage and partner’s earnings matter
only from age two on. Put diﬀerently, monetary incentives appear not always relevant for
mothers. Moreover, the eﬀects of education and age are mainly driven through imputed
wages. Additionally, labor force participation before birth is strongly positively related
to working hours thereafter as well as the region of residence.
These ﬁndings deserve further investigation, not least due to the topicality of the
subject in Germany. For example, what role does the new “Elterngeld” (parenting beneﬁt)
play for the responsiveness to work incentives? Moreover, it is obvious that the next step
consists of trying to ﬁnd a causal explanation for the changing work behavior of mothers
after childbirth. Here the causal eﬀect of age on employment outcomes after childbirth
could prove particularly interesting as childbirth is nowadays often postponed.
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Table 1: Heckman two-step wage imputation
Log wage equation Selection equation
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Work experience 0.013 (6.41) 0.180 (64.38)
Work experience square -0.0003 (-5.07) -0.003 (-32.64)
Unemployment experience -0.014 (-3.23) -0.273 (-39.24)
Unemployment experience square 0.0001 (0.21) 0.015 (20.10)
Age 0.022 (6.31) 0.284 (44.68)
Age square -0.0002 (-4.59) -0.005 (-51.12)
No training degree -0.189 (-26.81) -0.038 (-2.88)
University degree 0.310 (51.40) 0.171 (13.03)
Currently living in East -0.461 (-79.80) -0.047 (-3.73)
Number of children -0.240 (-23.65)
Dummy for child up to 3 -0.822 (-47.09)
Dummy for child 4 to 6 -0.102 (-5.66)
Dummy for child 7 to 12 0.001 (0.04)
Dummy for child 13 and over 0.126 (7.99)
Dummy for marriage -0.152 (-10.80)
Constant 1.753 (30.06) -4.364 (-44.51)
rho -.238***
sigma .557***




Table 2: Summary statistics
Pooled Age 1 Age 2 Age 3
Working hours 8.68 6.11 8.36 13.55
Working hours if positive 23.15 21.89 22.39 25.07
Participation rate 37.5% 28.5% 37.3% 54.0%
Imputed hourly wage 9.05 9.01 9.07 9.11
Squared imputed wage 86.62 85.91 86.87 87.58
Partner’s earnings 2262.52 2232.86 2290.68 2277.46
Partner’s earnings missing 18.6% 18.5% 17.5% 20.3% Dummy
Before birth not employed (Ref) 47.2% 47.5% 47.4% 46.4% Dummy
Before birth blue collar 12.2% 11.8% 12.2% 12.8% Dummy
Before birth self-employed 2.2% 2.4% 2.3% 2.0% Dummy
Before birth white collar 35.3% 35.3% 35.1% 35.7% Dummy
Before birth civil service 2.8% 2.9% 2.7% 2.7% Dummy
Before birth not available 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% Dummy
No professional training 21.3% 21.3% 21.4% 21.3% Dummy
Training degree (Ref.) 62.3% 61.6% 62.7% 62.9% Dummy
University degree 15.2% 15.8% 14.9% 14.6% Dummy
Currently in living East 18.4% 18.3% 17.8% 19.2% Dummy
Age 31.65 30.79 31.87 32.89
Age 18 - 22 8.0% 8.8% 7.6% 7.1% Dummy
Age 23 - 27 27.8% 28.1% 27.2% 27.9% Dummy
Age 28 - 32 (Ref.) 37.8% 37.3% 38.2% 38.2% Dummy
Age 33 - 37 21.0% 20.4% 21.0% 22.2% Dummy
Age 38 - 47 4.6% 4.7% 4.8% 4.0% Dummy
No other child=ﬁrst birth 36.4% 38.1% 32.7% 38.5% Dummy
Another child up to 3 12.2% 16.9% 13.2% 2.2% Dummy
Another child 4-6 (Ref.) 27.6% 29.8% 31.5% 18.5% Dummy
Another child 7-12 20.5% 12.8% 19.4% 35.8% Dummy
Another child 13-15 2.3% 1.6% 2.1% 3.5% Dummy
Another child 16+ 1.1% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% Dummy
Twin birth 2.7% 2.5% 2.9% 2.6% Dummy
Age of baby in months 27.74 18.06 30.04 42.03
Relative babyage in months 6.06 6.04 6.03
Parents in same house 15.1% 15.1% 15.5% 14.5% Dummy
Parents in neighborhood 23.6% 23.5% 24.3% 22.8% Dummy
Parents in same town (Ref.) 23.5% 23.7% 22.7% 24.3% Dummy
Parents in another town 24.9% 24.6% 24.1% 26.6% Dummy
Parents far away 8.7% 9.1% 8.9% 7.6% Dummy
Parents abroad 3.8% 3.8% 4.1% 3.7% Dummy
Married 86.2% 85.1% 87.1% 87.0% Dummy
Foreign nationality 16.5% 16.5% 16.7% 16.2% Dummy
Observations 3619 1562 1195 862
Reference categories for the later regression denoted by (Ref.)
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Table 3: Regression with interactions for separate ages: Coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance
At age 1 At age 2 At age 3
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Imputed hourly wage 2.308 (0.762) 18.71 (0.005) 15.34 (0.036)
Squared imputed wage 0.157 (0.551) -0.433 (0.071) -0.318 (0.192)
Partner’s earnings -0.00121 (0.123) -0.00133 (0.110) -0.00277 (0.000)
Partner’s earnings missing -9.844 (0.027) -6.862 (0.114) -5.645 (0.247)
Before birth blue collar 17.61 (0.000) 18.66 (0.000) 12.98 (0.005)
Before birth self-employed 42.13 (0.000) 39.84 (0.000) 17.91 (0.004)
Before birth white collar 23.47 (0.000) 24.78 (0.000) 8.915 (0.029)
Before birth civil service 39.47 (0.000) 38.63 (0.000) 19.81 (0.001)
Before birth not available 41.24 (0.025) 27.23 (0.018) 12.12 (0.239)
No professional training 6.018 (0.377) 12.55 (0.042) 0.928 (0.898)
University degree -8.097 (0.373) -19.37 (0.010) -21.45 (0.015)
Age 18 - 22 3.371 (0.689) 16.09 (0.025) 12.81 (0.073)
Age 23 - 27 7.110 (0.119) 12.70 (0.000) 3.559 (0.363)
Age 33 - 37 -2.809 (0.449) -5.495 (0.106) -7.068 (0.075)
Age 38 - 47 -11.38 (0.050) -7.924 (0.154) -15.53 (0.034)
Currently living in East 17.55 (0.231) 46.54 (0.000) 44.49 (0.002)
No other child=ﬁrst birth 1.665 (0.583) -6.954 (0.027) 1.928 (0.687)
Another child up to 3 0.782 (0.823) -7.045 (0.049) -11.55 (0.155)
Another child 7-12 -2.226 (0.553) -13.37 (0.000) -1.372 (0.698)
Another child 13-15 -3.348 (0.603) 0.199 (0.980) -4.119 (0.612)
Another child 16+ 2.254 (0.810) 5.494 (0.536) 9.655 (0.224)
Twin birth 7.961 (0.237) 9.867 (0.054) 14.07 (0.020)
Relative babyage in months 1.024 (0.002) 0.931 (0.003) 0.358 (0.343)
Parents in same house -3.998 (0.273) -0.713 (0.838) -2.691 (0.509)
Parents in neighborhood 0.701 (0.825) 3.685 (0.253) 1.914 (0.563)
Parents in another town 0.460 (0.892) -4.038 (0.205) 4.629 (0.225)
Parents far away 1.212 (0.758) -10.07 (0.019) 2.492 (0.611)
Parents abroad 7.391 (0.349) 10.10 (0.100) -0.236 (0.974)
Married -0.006 (0.999) -1.821 (0.629) -6.623 (0.191)
Foreign nationality 1.219 (0.789) 4.168 (0.302) 3.759 (0.340)
Constant -67.80 (0.190) -152.6 (0.001) -114.3 (0.022)
Observations 3475
Year dummies have been controlled for.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering.
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Table 4: Regression with interactions for separate ages: Marginal eﬀects
ME on actual variable ME on P(y > 0)
Imputed hourly wage .944 7.650 6.284 .032 .256 .210
Squared imputed wage .064 -.177 -.130 .002 -.006 -.004
Partner’s earnings .000 -.001 -.001 .000 -.000 -.000
Partner’s earnings missing -4.028 -2.807 -2.313 -.135 -.094 -.077
Before birth blue collar 7.202 7.635 5.318 .241 .255 .178
Before birth self-employed 17.23 16.31 7.337 .577 .545 .245
Before birth white collar 9.600 10.14 3.652 .321 .339 .122
Before birth civil service 16.15 15.80 8.112 .540 .529 .271
Before birth not available 16.88 11.14 4.965 .565 .373 .166
No professional training 2.462 5.134 .380 .082 .172 .013
University degree -3.313 -7.924 -8.785 -.111 -.265 -.294
Age 18 - 22 1.378 6.585 5.249 .046 .220 .175
Age 23 - 27 2.907 5.200 1.458 .097 .174 .049
Age 33 - 37 -1.148 -2.250 -2.896 -.038 -.075 -.097
Age 38 - 47 -4.652 -3.244 -6.366 -.156 -.109 -.213
Currently living in East 7.178 19.04 18.23 .240 .637 .609
No other child=ﬁrst birth .681 -2.846 .790 .023 -.095 .026
Another child up to 3 .320 -2.884 -4.733 .011 -.096 -.158
Another child 7-12 -.910 -5.474 -.562 -.030 -.183 -.019
Another child 13-15 -1.369 .081 -1.687 -.046 .003 -.056
Another child 16+ .921 2.250 3.954 .031 .075 .132
Twin birth 3.255 4.042 5.762 .109 .135 .193
Relative babyage in months .419 .381 .147 .014 .013 .005
Parents in same house -1.635 -.292 -1.102 -.055 -.010 -.037
Parents in neighborhood .287 1.510 .784 .010 .050 .026
Parents in another town .188 -1.655 1.896 .006 -.055 .063
Parents far away .495 -4.127 1.021 .017 -.138 .034
Parents abroad 3.021 4.139 -.097 .101 .138 -.003
Married -.002 -.745 -2.715 - .000 -.025 -.091
Foreign nationality .498 1.706 1.540 .017 .057 .051
Constant -27.72 -62.51 -46.81 -.928 -2.089 -1.565
Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%-level.
Year dummies have been controlled for.
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